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STATElVIENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal is from the district court's August 22, 2016 Memorandum Decision
viJ

granting the State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing PetitionerAppellant Osman Mohammed Noor's petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(R. at 879-882.) The district court entered its final order on September 2, 2016. (R. at

vi)

890-891.) Mr. Noor filed his appeal on September 27, 2016. (R. at 894-895.) This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code sections 78B-9-l 10 and 78A-4-103.
~

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue: After the district court specifically allowed Mr. Noor's newly appointed pro
bono counsel to file an amended petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, did it
err in holding the claims in his amended petition were time-barred because they did not
relate-back to the claims raised in his original petition?
Standard of Review: "We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a
petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's
'4D

conclusions oflaw." McNab" v. State, 2014 UT App 127, 16,328 P.3d 874 (quoting
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ~ 7, 94 P.3d 263).

Preservation: This issue was preserved in multiple areas of the trial record
including in the district court's Memorandum Decision (R. at 879-882), and Mr. Noor's
Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 759-766.)

1
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DETERMINATIVE LAW

Appellant believes the following statutes and rules are determinative of the appeal
or are of central importance to the appeal:
•

Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Utah Code§§ 78b-9-101 to -110)

•

Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

•

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

The foregoing authorities are voluminous and are reproduced in Addendum A, B,
and C, respectively pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A..

Nature of the Case, Course ofProceedings, and Disposition Below.

This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of Mr. Noor's amended
petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA"). (R. 879-882.) After Mr.
Noor filed his amended PCRA petition, the State moved for summary judgment on
various issues. (R. at 356-409.) The district court granted the State's motion and
dismissed Mr. Noor's amended petition on the ground that it was barred by the PCRA's
statute of limitations. (R. at 882; see Addendum D.) The district court did not reach the
merits of Mr. Noor's claims.

B..

Statement ofthe Facts.

Mr. Noor is a Somali refugee who has little grasp of the English language. (R. at
20-21, 197, 199, 253.) He cannot read or write in English, and he requires the assistance

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 2
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of an interpreter in order to communicate effectively with English speakers. (R. at 197,
199-201, 253.)
vib

On May 28, 2009, Mr. Noor was arrested based on allegations made by the
manager of the apartment where he was living. (R. at 199.) On July 6, 2009, he was
charged with one count of burglary, one count of forcible sexual abuse, and one count of
lewdness. (R. at 199.) He was appointed counsel from the Legal Defender's Office. (R. at
197, 199.) Mr. Noor could only communicate with his counsel through a Somali

~

interpreter. (R. at 571-72.) From the time Mr. Noor was charged and throughout trial, he
struggled with obtaining adequate interpretation and struggled to understand the
allegations against him. For instance, the police report against Mr. Noor was never
interpreted for him, and he could not understand what it said on his own. (R. at 579.)
Moreover, at one pre-trial meeting at his attorney's office, his attorney obtained the
services of a Mr. Ali to interpret for Mr. Noor. (R. at 571.) Mr. Noor informed his
attorney that he had a personal conflict with Mr. Ali and that Mr. Ali was not a capable
interpreter. (R. at 571-72.) His attorney did not obtain another interpreter. (R. at 572.)
This made it impossible for Mr. Noor to communicate with his attorney. (R. at 572.)
At trial, two interpreters were assigned to interpret for Mr. Noor. (R. at 656-657).
One individual interpreted at a time, while the other took a break. (R. at 656-57.) Mr. Ali
was one of these interpreters. (R. at 572.) Mr. Ali interpreted much of the trial, and Mr.
Noor could not understand Mr. Ali's interpretation. (R. at 201, 572.) Mr. Noor did not

3
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understand the testimony of his accuser and did not understand what was going on at
trial. (R. at 198, 201, 572.) Although Mr. Noor told his attorney that he could not
understand the proceedings against him, his attorney did nothing to fix the problem. (R.
at 201.) The jury returned a guilty verdict. (R. at 199, 228-229.) Mr. Noor was sentenced
to concurrent l-to-15 year prison terms for burglary and forcible sexual abuse and
ordered credit for time served on his lewdness conviction. (R. at 229-230.)
Mr. Noor appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 234-237) His trial attorney
was also one of his attorneys on appeal. (R. at 228, 234.) His sole argument was that the
state presented insufficient evidence that he had the requisite intent for the crimes on
which he was convicted. (R. at 234-36.) The Court of Appeals affinned. (R. at 234.) Mr.
Noor filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, which was
denied on October 17, 2012. (R. at 231.)
On November 5, 2013, without the assistance of counsel, Mr. Noor filed his initial
petition for relief under the PCRA. (R. at 1-12.) There is no dispute that this petition was
timely under the PCRA' s statute of limitations and was actually filed two months before
the statutory deadline of January 15, 2014. (R. at 880); see also Utah Code§ 78B-9107(1). In this petition, Mr. Noor raised three claims for relief, including ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. (R. at 6-8.) On the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim,
Mr. Noor argued that "trial counsel should have brought to the trial court's attention the
fact that [his] cultural background prevented him from forming the requisite intent to

4
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commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse" and also that trial counsel should have raised
his "lack of fluency in English." (R. at 7.)
Mr. Noor filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel on the same day he

v;p

filed this initial PCRA petition. (R. at 1, 26.) The basis for this motion was that the
petition was complex and English was not Mr. Noor's first language. (R. at 26.) On
December 30, 2013, the district court denied Mr. Noor's motion on the basis that "the
issues of law and/or facts are not of a complicated nature such that assistance of counsel
~

would be required for proper adjudication." (R. at 40.)
On March 15 and March 21, 2014, after the State filed its initial motion for
summary judgment, Mr. Noor wrote to the court, with assistance from another inmate,
explaining his "inability to read and write English," and requesting that the court appoint
counsel to assist with his case. (R. at 101, 104 (Mr. Noor's letters); R. 68-91 (State's
initial Motion for Summary Judgment)). In response, on April 7, 2014, the court ordered
that Mr. Noor be appointed pro bono counsel and requested the Utah State Bar's
assistance in making that appointment. (R. at 107-08). As part of this ruling, the court
acknowledged "Mr. Noor's representation that he cannot read or write" and concluded
"that this will make it difficult for him to address the facts and issues in this case." (R. at

0:1

108.) Based on the filings Mr. Noor had made up to that time, the Court concluded that
"he must be receiving assistance from someone ifhe is unable to read or write." (R. at
108.)

5
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On October 7, 2014, Mr. Noor's first pro bono attorneys entered an appearance on
his behalf. (R. at 113, 117.) Prior to filing any substantive documents, these attorneys
sought leave to withdraw as Mr. Noor's counsel. (R. at 128-29.) The court granted their
motion on December 8, 2014. (R. 143.)
On March 4, 2015, Sam Alba of Snow, Christensen & Martineau accepted the
appointment as Mr. Noor's pro bono counsel. (R. at 153-54.) On April 27, 2015, the
district court held a hearing with Mr. Alba and counsel for the State. (R. at 906-915; see
Addendum E). At the beginning of the hearing, the court stated as follows:

Mr. Alba, Mr. Noor, as you know, filed a prose petition challenging his
convictions in this case and in a habeas fashion. And before we proceed
with setting any dates, I wanted to inquire if you wanted time to file a
supplemental or amended petition as counsel for Mr. Noor ....
(R. at 909.) Mr. Noor's counsel responded, "I have reviewed the original petition filed by

Mr. Noor. I don't think it is adequate. I think we need an opportunity to try and put some
substance to it. In order to do that, I need a little bit of time." (R. at 910.) The court
responded, "I'm happy- and I don't think [counsel for the State] has an objection to
giving you time to file an amended petition." (R. at 910.) The State did not object. (See

generally R. at 906-915).
On August 28, 2015, Mr. Noor filed his amended PCRA petition ("Amended
Petition") along with a memorandum of points and authority. (R. at 185-333.) Mr. Noor
raised four claims for relief. (R. at 192). The first two claims asserted Mr. Noor's trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a competent interpreter for Mr. Noor at trial.
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(R. at 190-91.) The third claim alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allow

Mr. Noor to aid in his own defense prior to trial. (R. at 191.) The fourth claim alleged
vii

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Mr. Noor of the risk of deportation ifhe
was found guilty. (R. at 192.)
On November 25, 2015, the State filed a motion and memorandum in support of
summary judgment seeking to dismiss Mr. Noor's claims on various grounds. (R. at 356409.) As relevant here, the State argued the claims in Mr. Noor's amended petition were

~

untimely under the PCRA' s statute of limitations, and were therefore barred because they
did not relate back to the claims in his original petition. (R. at 380.)
On August 22, 2016, after briefing was completed and oral argument was held, the
Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Noor's
claims in his Amended Petition were barred under the PCRA's statute of limitations. (R.
at 882.) Although the Court previously allowed Mr. Noor the opportunity to amend his
petition with the assistance of his newly appointed counsel, the court explained as
follows:
Mr. Noor argues that the Court should deem his claims in the Amended
Petition timely because the Court granted Mr. Noor leave to amend the
Original Petition at the status conference held on April 27, 2015. However,
at that status conference, the limitations period was not raised by the parties
or addressed [by] the Court. To the contrary, counsel for Mr. Noor only
stated that he was requesting leave to amend the Original Petition "to try
and put some substance to it," and that he needed some time to "ascertain
whether there are any other issues that need to be raised" in the amended
pleading. At no point did counsel make any mention of the limitations
period and its impact on the new claims. Therefore, the statute of

7
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limitations issue was not before the Court, nor did the Court address that
issue when the Court granted Mr. Noor leave to amend his petition.
(R. at 881). Additionally, relying on Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,r 91, 234 P.3d 1115,
the court reasoned that it lacked the authority "to extend the limitations period when it
granted Mr. Noor's leave to amend the Original Petition." (R. at 881)
Based on this reasoning, the court analyzed whether the claims in Mr. Noor's
Amended Petition "related back" to the original petition. (R. at 881-82.) It concluded they
did not. (R. at 882.) Accordingly, it granted the State's motion for summary judgment,
and dismissed Mr. Noor's petition without reaching the merits of his claims. (R. at 882.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred in ruling that Mr. Noor's Amended Petition under the
PCRA was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Although the court previously
ruled that Mr. Noor could file a "supplemental or amended petition" to "put some
substance to it," it later backtracked on this decision. It reasoned that it lacked the
authority to allow amended petitions that raised new claims after the original statute of
limitations expired. It then concluded Mr. Noor's claims in his Amended Petition were
barred because they did not "relate back" to the claims in his initial petition. The Court's
decision conflicts with the letter and spirit of the PCRA, Rule 65C and Rule 15 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah appellate decisions addressing amended PCRA
Petitions.
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The text of the PCRA grants district court's discretion to allow amended PCRA
petitions, even if they raise new claims and even if the amendments are made after the
i.tJ

original statute of limitations has expired. This is particularly appropriate after the district
court has appointed pro bono counsel to assist the petitioner. If counsel cannot assist in
amending a petition that was initially filed pro se by their client, counsel's ability to
provide meaningful assistance could be severely limited. This is contrary to the intent of
the PCRA, which suggests pro bono counsel should be permitted to assist their client at

~

all stages of the PCRA process. Although no Utah court has directly addressed whether
PCRA petitions may be amended to add new claims after the original statute of
limitations has expired, several decisions strongly suggest that such amendments are
commonplace and expected.
Even if district courts do not have authority to allow amended PCRA petitions
with new claims after the statute of limitations has expired, Mr. Noor's amended claims
relate back to the claims raised in his initial petition. Mr. Noor's initial petition claimed
that his trial counsel was ineffective, in part, for failing to consider his cultural
background and failing to raise his lack of fluency in English. Similarly, the core of Mr.
Noor's amended claims is that Mr. Noor's trial counsel failed to consider his cultural
background and failed to address his difficulty communicating in English. Although Mr.
Noor's amended claims are not exactly the same as his original claims, Utah courts
require that his original claims be liberally construed and considered in light of the fact

9
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that he filed them pro se. Viewed through this lens, his amended claims plainly relate
back to his initial claims, and the district court erred in holding otherwise.

Mr. Noor requests that the district court's decision be reversed and remanded so
that the district court can consider the merits of his PCRA claims.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD DISCRETION TO ALLOW MR. NOOR TO
AMEND HIS PCRA PETITION, AND IT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
CLAIMS IN HIS AMENDED PETITION WERE BARRED BECAUSE
THEY DID NOT RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL PETITION.
A.

The Text of the PCRA and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Allow Amended PCRA Petitions After the Statute of Limitations Has
Expired, Especially After Pro Bono Counsel Is Appointed.

The letter and spirit of Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") and Rule
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically contemplate that a petitioner may
amend his petition for post-conviction relief with leave of the court so long as the original
petition was timely filed. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(k). Although the district court initially
allowed Mr. Noor to amend his petition after he was appointed counsel, it later
backtracked, explaining that it lacked the authority "to extend the limitations period when
it granted Mr. Noor leave to amend." (R. at 881.) The court's ruling, however, ignores the
broad discretion the PCRA affords trial courts in allowing amended petitions.
The text of Rule 65C discusses amendments to PCRA petitions in two separate
provisions. First, Rule 65C(h)(3) provides that the trial court may allow an amended
petition when the petition "is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading
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error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule." Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(h)(3).
Such amendments must be filed within 21 days, unless the trial court in its discretion
vti

allows "one additional 21-day period to amend for good cause shown." Utah R. Civ. P.
65C(h)(3). This provision places no restriction on the claims that may be raised in the
amended petition, and does not suggest that such claims must be the same or relate back
to the original petition. Moreover, by not mentioning the PCRA's statute of limitations,
amended petitions filed after the original statutory deadline will be, and almost certainly

~

are, fully considered by PCRA courts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(h)(3).
Second, Rule 65C(k) provides that after the answer or further response is filed,
"further pleadings or amendments" may be permitted if "ordered by the court." Id.
65C(k). This provision leaves it within the trial court's discretion as to whether to allow
amended PCRA petitions. This is consistent with Utah law providing that "[t]he granting
or denial of leave to amend a pleading is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and
[appellate courts] will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of an abuse of that
discretion." Shah v. IntermountainHealthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 261, iJ 6,314 P.3d
1079 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Both Rule 65C(h)(3) and 65C(k) contemplate that the trial court will have
discretion in determining whether to allow a petitioner to file an amended petition, even
if it raises new claims and even after the statute of limitations has expired. When reading
these provisions in conjunction with the appointment of pro bono counsel provisions, it is

11
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apparent that the legislature understood that certain litigants should be provided
assistance throughout the entire PCRA process. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65CG).
For instance, prior to appointing counsel, the trial court must undertake a
preliminary analysis to determine whether based on the unique facts of the case pro bono
counsel should be appointed. This analysis requires courts to "review the petition, and ...
if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an
order dismissing the claim." Id. 65C(h)(l), G). It is only after the court has undertaken
this preliminary analysis that the Rule authorizes the court to assess whether pro bono
counsel should be appointed. Id. 65CG); see also Utah Code§ 78B-9-109. Specifically,
"[i]n determining whether to appoint counsel the court shall consider whether the petition
or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing and
whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance
of counsel for proper adjudication." Id.
In this case, the court presumably undertook this analysis, determined Mr. Noor's
claims were not frivolous, and used its discretion to appoint Mr. Noor pro bono counsel.

It explained that because Mr. Noor "cannot read or write ... this will make it difficult for
him to address the facts and issues in this case." (R. at 108.) It also acknowledged that
based on Mr. Noor's prior filings he "must be receiving assistance from someone." (R. at
108.) Given Mr. Noor's limitations, while his initial claims may not have been frivolous,

12
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this does not mean they were the claims Mr. Noor intended to raise or the worthiest of the
court's consideration.
Because Mr. Noor cannot read or write English, and needed assistance in filing his
original PCRA petition, it follows that he likely had little understanding of the issues
identified in his original petition. Individuals like Mr. Noor need assistance at all stages
of the PCRA process, from filing of the petition, through trial and the appeals process.
Because the initial petition is critical to ultimate success in a PCRA case, to only allow
~

counsel to assist after the initial pleading stage would make the appointment of counsel
futile in many cases where meritorious claims exist. Moreover, it would provide
petitioners who can afford counsel from the outset of their case a decisive advantage in
the PCRA process. Certainly, this could not have been the intent of the legislature. See

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 675-76 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[B]y hobbling
counsel this way, the Court limits the capacity of appointed counsel to provide the
professional service that a paid lawyer, hired at the outset, can give a client").

1

1

The potential effect of the district court's ruling on the ability to locate pro bono counsel
should also be considered. While lawyers have a public duty to provide pro bono
assistance, and while it is an honor and a privilege to serve those in need, it took nearly a
year and a half to locate conflict free counsel for Mr. Noor. One of the primary
motivations for counsel performing pro bono work is the possibility of making a
difference in their client's lives. See April Faith-Slaker, What We Know and Need to
Know About Pro Bono Service Delivery, 67 S.C. L. Rev. 267, 269-70 (2016). If pro bono
lawyers are not permitted to amend their client's PCRA petition, the ability of counsel to
make a difference in their client's case may be severely limited. Moreover, the lawyer's
ability to use his or her own unique knowledge and creative talents will be greatly
diminished. These limitations have the potential to further narrow the pool of lawyers
13
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Rather, both the text of the PCRA and Rule 65C contemplate that pro bono
counsel will be able to assist their clients at all stages of their case. This includes ensuring
that the initial PCRA petition sets forth the issues most worthy of the PCRA court's
consideration. If instead, pro bono counsel is forced to make their client's case based on
the issues raised in their client's original pro se petition, it is unlikely counsel can do
anything to resuscitate a petition that was dead from the start.
Here, upon appointment, Mr. Noor's counsel explained that the initial petition was
inadequate. (R. at 910.) Accordingly, with the blessing of the district court, counsel
diligently identified claims with a better chance of prevailing. To deny Mr. Noor the
benefit of this assistance, where he had otherwise diligently complied with the deadlines
imposed by the PCRA, would be a grave miscarriage of justice.
Fortunately, the PCRA and Rule 65C provide trial courts the discretion to allow
amended petitions when appropriate. In a case such as this, where Mr. Noor filed his
original PCRA petition months before the statutory deadline, but pro bono counsel was ·
not appointed for nearly a year and a half later, this is precisely the type of case where an
amended PCRA petition should be allowed, even if it raises new claims that do not relate
back to the original petition.

with the time, willingness, and ability to assist in PCRA cases. See id. at 284 (explaining
that a pro bono attorney's "motivations, resource constraints, and professional life
inform[] the answer to the question of whether this particular person will provide pro
bono service, and for how many hours").
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B.

Utah Supreme Court Precedent Suggests Trial Courts Have the Discretion
to Allow Amended PCRA Petitions After the Statute of Limitations Has
Expired.

The State admits that "Utah courts have not yet addressed the relation-back
doctrine in the context of post-conviction relief," but the weight of Utah appellate
decisions strongly suggests that relation-back is not a requirement for amendments under
the PCRA. (R. at 382.) For example, in Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32,279 P.3d 396, the
Utah Supreme Court approved amendments to a post-conviction relief petition when both
~

the petitioner and the prosecutor stipulated to such an amendment. Id.

11 16-17. There,

Mr. Gregg's initial PCRA petition was dismissed by the district court for reasons not
stated in the opinion. Id. 114. Nonetheless, "the Davis County Attorney's office
stipulated that Mr. Gregg could amend his original petition." Id. 114. In his amended
petition, Mr. Gregg raised eleven claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel. Id. Although not reflected in the Supreme Court's Opinion, briefing in that case
reflects that the amended petition raised new claims well after the statute of limitations
period had expired. 2 After the amended petition was filed, Davis County moved for

2

Mr. Gregg admitted in his appellate briefing that his amended petition, filed on August
23, 2007, "raised new claims." Brief of Appellant, David Vincent Gregg v. State of Utah,
No. 20090567 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009), at 4, relevant portion attached as
AddendumF.
A review of the appellate and trial court dockets reveals that these claims were untimely
under the logic used by the trial court in this case. The Utah Court of Appeals decided
Mr. Gregg's initial appeal on June 3, 2005, and the Utah Supreme Court denied his
petition for certiorari on October 4, 2005. See State v. Gregg, 2005 UT App 258; State v.
Gregg, 125 P.3d 102 (Table) (Utah 2005). The PCRA trial court's docket reflects that
15
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summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed all of Mr. Gregg's claims as
procedurally barred. Jd.
On appeal, the State sought dismissal of Mr. Gregg's petition because "it was
procedurally improper for the Davis County Attorney to stipulate to Mr. Gregg's
amended petition because the State Attorney General's office is the only party who can
permit an extension under rule 65C(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. ,I 16.
Rule 65C(i) governs the service of PCRA petitions. It provides that in petitions
challenging felony convictions, the State of Utah is the proper party to be served, and in
all other cases, it is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. See id. In
Gregg's case, the clerk of the trial court, inadvertently served Davis County, rather than
the State. 2012 UT 32, ,I 17. Davis County did not forward the petition to the State, and
instead stipulated that Mr. Gregg could file an amended petition. Id. The State argued this

Mr. Gregg filed his original petition for post-conviction relief on October 2, 2006, his
first amended petition for post-conviction relief on February 20, 2007, and his second
amended petition for post-conviction relief, which was the petition at issue in the
Supreme Court's opinion, on August 23, 2007. See Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, 279 P.3d
396 attached as Addendum G.
Thus, under the PCRA's statute of limitations provision (Utah Code§ 78B-9-107(2)(c)),
the deadline for Mr. Gregg to file his PCRA petition was in mid-January 2007 at the
latest. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (providing that the deadline to file a petition for writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court is 90-days after entry of the state court's
judgment). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did dismiss the case on the grounds that it
was barred by the statute of limitations, and rejected the procedural claims raised by the
State.

16
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stipulation was improper because Davis County was without authority to enter into such a
stipulation. Id. ,I 16.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Id. ,I 17. Because it was not Mr.
Gregg's fault that the wrong party was served, the Court held that "it was reasonable for
Mr. Gregg to believe that the Davis County Attorney had authority to stipulate to the
t.;p

filing of his amended petition." Id. ,I 17. The Court therefore proceeded to address the
merits of Mr. Gregg's claims, and ultimately vacated his conviction and remanded for a
~

new trial. Id. ,I 49.
By accepting the validity of Mr. Gregg's amended petition, the Utah Supreme
Court implicitly acknowledged that amendments to PCRA petitions are allowed when the
prosecutor agrees to such amendment, regardless of when such amendments are filed. See
id.

1 16. Similarly, it follows that trial courts should have the same discretion to allow

amended petitions even if the amended claims do not relate back to the claims raised in
the original petition.
Various other Utah cases have suggested that whether an amendment is allowed is
up to the discretion of the trial court. For instance, in Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53,
165 P.3d 1195, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "[e]ven if it is true that
[petitioner] lacked the resources to adequately research his ... claim, and therefore
needed the assistance of an attorney, this state-of-affairs did not prevent him from filing
an initial petition for post-conviction relief ... and subsequently amending it, if

17
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necessary, pursuant to Rule 15." Id.

,r 34. In short, the Utah Supreme Court recognized

that petitioners may file a prose petition for post-conviction relief to satisfy the statute of
limitations and then amend that petition with the assistance of counsel. This is precisely
what Mr. Noor attempted to do in this case.
Moreover, other Utah cases indicate that PCRA petitions are commonly amended
after the statute of limitations has expired, which suggests that the district court's ruling
in this case is an anomaly that needs to be corrected. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 2016 UT
App 190, ,r 37,382 P.3d 1063 (suggesting that a PCRA petitioner could have amended
his petition to add an additional claim); Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ,r 61, 367 P.3d 968,
980, reh'g denied (Dec. 18, 2015) (noting that in a PCRA case, "[a] denial of a motion to
amend usually requires explanation").
The district court justified its ruling on the basis that it lacked the discretion to
allow Mr. Noor's amended claims to proceed based on the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,r 58, 234 P.3d 1115. (R. at 881.) But Gardner
did not address the situation here where an original petition was timely filed and where
the trial court specifically authorized and directed the petitioner to amend his petition. See

Gardner, 2010 UT 46, ,r 1. Rather, Gardner addressed the petitioner's third-petition for
post-conviction relief, which he filed nearly twenty-five years after his initial conviction.

Id.

,r,r 1, 46. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that "[a]ll of the claims Mr. Gardner raises in

his most recent petition for post-conviction relief are claims that he could have raised

18
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more than a decade ago." Id.

,r 98. Unlike this case, Gardner is a case where the

petitioner filed multiple separate and independent PCRA petitions over several decades
seeking any avenue possible to avoid the death penalty. It is a case where Mr. Gardner
and his counsel tested the limits of the PCRA, and where the Utah Supreme Court
explained the PCRA is an exhaustible resource. Notwithstanding the Court's denial of

Mr. Gardner's petition, the court explained, "Throughout the lengthy course of this case,
multiple courts, including this one, have endeavored to scrupulously ensure that Mr.
~

Gardner's rights are protected. We are firmly convinced that he has been treated justly
and fairly." Id.

,r 99.

Unlike Mr. Gardner, Mr. Noor is not testing the limits of the PCRA. He is simply
seeking his one opportunity to present his claims before the PCRA court. In doing so, he
filed his PCRA petition two months early, and immediately asked that pro bono counsel
be appointed to assist him. Through no fault of his own, it took nearly a year-and-a-half
to locate pro bono counsel. To deny him the opportunity to pursue the claims in his
0Ji>

Amended Petition, after the district court expressly allowed amendment, is unjust and
unfair. Compare Gardner, 2010 UT 46, ,r 99. Mr. Noor respectfully requests that the
ruling of the district court be reversed and remanded so that the merits of his claims can

{@

be addressed.
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II.

ALTERNATIVELY, THE CLAIMS IN MR. NOOR'S AMENDED
PETITION RELATE BACK TO THE CLAIMS IN THE ORIGINAL
PETITION.
'
IfMr. Noor's claims in his Amended Petition are required to relate back to the

claims in the original petition, that requirement is satisfied. All of Mr. Noor's current
claims relate to his trial counsel's ineffective assistance, which was raised in the original
petition. Although the basis for the claims of ineffective assistance are not identical, the
original and amended claims all relate to the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.
Pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[w]henever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)
(emphasis added). "The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of
litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of
limitations were intended to provide." 2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos,
LLC, 2016 UT App 89, ,r 14, 372 P.3d 683, cert. granted 379 P.3d 1182 (Utah 2016)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "The same general standard of notice
applies regardless of whether a litigant seeks to add defendants, plaintiffs, or claims." Id.
Additionally, the scope of Mr. Noor's original prose petition for post-conviction
relief must be "liberally construed." McNab" v. State, 2014 UT App 127, ,r 12, 328 P.3d
874. Regardless of how "inartfully pleaded, [it] must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed ... if it appears
20
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beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Moreover, prose litigants are "accorded every consideration that
may reasonably be indulged." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,r 19, 128 P.3d 1171 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying these standards, Utah courts have liberally construed PCRA petitions,
even when they have been filed beyond the statute of limitations. For example, in McNair
~

v. State, 2014 UT App 127, 328 P.3d 874, the petitioner filed a prose PCRA petition one
month after the statute oflimitations expired. ld.,r 3. In the petition, McNair explained
that he was mentally challenged, but did not specifically request that the statute of
limitations be tolled for that reason. Id. 14. The State moved to dismiss the petition on
the ground that it was time-barred. Id.

,r 5. The trial court granted this motion, and

McNair appealed. Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed. Id.

1 I. In doing so, it cited the provisions

above requiring that prose petitions be liberally construed. Id.

,r,r 12-16. It held that

although McNair's petition was "inartfully squared with the provisions of the PCRA and
that the petition failed to explicitly ask the trial court to toll the statute of limitations due
to McNair's mental incapacity," it was sufficient "to survive the State's motion to
dismiss." Id.

,r 13. Although McNair did not deal with the issue of relation back, its
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liberal construction of the petitioner's petition is instructive as to how the district court
should have interpreted the claims in Mr. Noor's original prose petition.
Here, when Mr. Noor filed his initial petition prose, the State was placed on
notice that Mr. Noor was arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. (R. at 6-10); 20101 RADC/CADC Venture, 2016 UT App 89, ,r 14. Specifically, his initial ineffective

assistance claim highlighted that trial counsel failed to consider Mr. Noor's "cultural
background," his "lack of fluency in English," and suggested an overall lack of effective
communication between trial counsel and Mr. Noor. (R. at 6-10.) For instance, Mr. Noor
argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to bring "to the trial court's attention
the fact that Petitioner's cultural background prevented him from forming the requisite
intent to commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse." (R. at 6-7.) He also claimed that trial
counsel should have raised his "lack of fluency in English." (R. at 7.)
When this claim is liberally construed, it involves the same conduct, transaction,
or occurrence as the claims in Mr. Noor's Amended Petition. For instance, his first and
second claims in his Amended Petition are based on the fact that his trial counsel failed to
obtain a competent interpreter. (R. at 190-91.) As in the original petition, these claims
relate directly to trial counsel's failure to consider Mr. Noor's cultural background and
his inability to understand the English language. (R. at 7.) Similarly, Mr. Noor's thirdclaim regarding trial counsel's failure to allow Mr. Noor to assist in his own defense at
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trial also implicates counsel's failure to consider Mr. Noor's cultural background and
language ability in developing Mr. Noor's defense. (R. at 7; 191-92.)
Mr. Noor's fourth claim deals with trial counsel's ineffective assistance in failing
to advise him of the risk of deportation to Somalia if a jury found him guilty. (R. at 192.)
In Somalia, Mr. Noor would be at risk of death, torture, and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. (R. at 192.) Again, this relates back to trial counsel's failure to
consider Mr. Noor's cultural background in presenting his defense. (R. at 7.)
,Al

vs

Although Mr. Noor's claims in his Amended Petition differ from those in his
original petition, at their core, they relate to trial counsel's ineffectiveness, and more
specifically, relate to counsel's failure to consider his cultural and linguistic background
in presenting his defense. While acting prose, Mr. Noor knew his trial counsel was
ineffective and attempted to raise claims asserting that ineffectiveness. See Utah R. Civ.
P. 15(c) (allowing claims to relate back if they were "set forth or attempted to be set forth

in the original pleading"). Simply because Mr. Noor is not legally trained and has a
limited grasp of the English language, should not prevent his PCRA counsel from
bolstering the ineffective assistance of counsel claims Mr. Noor raised in his original
petition.
As Utah case law makes clear, the key criteria in analyzing whether a claim relates
back to the initial pleading is notice. 2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, 2016 UT App 89, ~
14. Mr. Noor's prose petition satisfies the notice requirement because it put the State on

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

notice that he was raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his trial
attorney. Where Mr. Noor filed his original petition prose, this Court should liberally
construe his original claims and hold that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
made in his Amended Petition relate back to the date of his original pleading.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order of the district court,
and remand with instructions to consider the merits of Mr. Noor's claims.
DATED this 27th day of January, 2017.
SNOW CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Samuel Alba ~
Robert T. Denny
Attorneys for Appellant
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§ 78B-9-101. Title, UT ST§ 78B-9-101

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-101
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-1O1
§

78B-9-101. Title
Currentness

This chapter is known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act."

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1165, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (10)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-101, UT ST§ 78B-9-101
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
L 2017 Thomson Reuters. No daim

End of Document

WESTLAW
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original U.S. Ciovcrnm~nt Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government VVorks.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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§ 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies, UT ST§ 78B-9-102

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-102
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-35a-102
§ 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies
Currentness
( 1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense
and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). This
chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or common law writs. Proceedings under this
chapter are civil and are governed by the rules of civil procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and commencement
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(2) This chapter does not apply to:

(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense;

(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or

(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1166, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 2, eff. May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (29)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-102, UT ST§ 78B-9-102
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Dotum,·nr

·Z' 2017 Thomson Reuter:.. No daim to origin~!l U.S. Government Works.
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§ 788-9-103. Applicability--Effect on petitions, UT ST§ 788-9-103

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-103
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-103
§ 78B-9-1O3. Applicability--Effect on petitions

Currentness
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-l 07, this chapter applies only to post-conviction proceedings
filed on or after July 1, 1996.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1167, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.

Notes of Decisions ( 1)

~

U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-103, UT ST§ 78B-9-103
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule, UT ST§ 788-9-104

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-9-104
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-104
§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule

Currentness
(I) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal
offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:

(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution;

(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally
protected;

(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling statutory provisions;

(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution;

(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, because:

(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to
include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;

(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;

(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and

(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier
of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or

WESTLAW
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§ 788-9-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule, UT ST § 788-9-104

(0 the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah
Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that:

(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or sentence became final; or

(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted.

(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes that there would be a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed
with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing.

(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for which
convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction
Determination of Factual Innocence. Claims under Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA or Part 4, Postconviction
Determination of Factual Innocence of this chapter may not be filed as part of a petition under this part, but shall be filed
separately and in conformity with the provisions of Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA or Part 4, Postconviction
Determination of Factual Innocence.

Credits
~

Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1168, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 3, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 153, § 1, eff. March
25, 2010.

Notes of Decisions (96)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-104, UT ST§ 78B-9-104
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 78B-9-105. Burden of proof, UT ST§ 78B-9-105

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-105
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-35a-105
§ 78B-9-105. Burden of proof
Currentness
( 1) The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle
the petitioner to relief. The court may not grant relief without determining that the petitioner is entitled to relief under
the provisions of this chapter and in light of the entire record, including the record from the criminal case under review.

(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78B-9-106, but once a ground
has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1169, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 4, eff. May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (6)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-105, UT ST§ 78B-9-105
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception, UT ST§ 78B-9-106

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-106
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-106
§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception

Currentness
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:

(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;

(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;

(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;

(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised
in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or

(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.

(2)(a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the state's appeal from
an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or
procedural bar at an earlier time.

(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and
an opportunity to be heard.

~

(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but
was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the exception set forth in Subsection (3).

I.JJ

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1170, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 5, cff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 48, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-106, UT ST§ 78B-9-106
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document

{;1

2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Digitized byReuters.
the Howard
W.claim
HuntertoLaw
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson
No
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

§ 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief, UT ST§ 78B-9-107

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-107
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-35a-107
§

78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
Currentness

(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued.

(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:

(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken;

(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken;

(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;

(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari
review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed;

(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary
facts on which the petition is based; or

(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is established.

(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to
state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The petitioner has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection (3).

(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting:

(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or

(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401.
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(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this section.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1171, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 6, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 358, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (77)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-107, UT ST§ 78B-9-107
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End or Document
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§ 78B-9-108. Effect of granting relief--Notice, UT ST§ 78B-9-108

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-108
Formerly cited as UT ST§ 78-35a-1O8
§ 78B-9-108. Effect of granting relief--Notice

Currentness
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either:

(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or

(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or sentencing proceeding as appropriate.

(2)(a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed for five days. Within the stay period,
the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial or
sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no action.

(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during the stay period that it intends to take no
action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner.

(c) If the respondent gives notice of intent to appeal the court's decision, the stay provided for by Subsection (2)(a)
shall remain in effect until the appeal concludes, including any petitions for rehearing or for discretionary review by a
higher court. The court may lift the stay if the petitioner can make the showing required for a certificate of probable
cause under Section 77-20-10 and URCP 27.

(d) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the petitioner, the trial court may order any
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1172, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 7, eff. May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (1)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-108, UT ST§ 78B-9-108
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
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§ 788-9-108. Effect of granting relief-Notice, UT ST§ 788-9-108
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§ 788-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel, UT ST§ 788-9-109

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annas)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-109
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-109
§ 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel

Currentness
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner,
appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal.
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to represent the petitioner
under this section.

~

(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following factors:

(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing; and

(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper
adjudication.

(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent
post-conviction petition.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1173, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 8, eff. May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions ( I0)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-109, UT ST§ 78B-9-109
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 788-9-110. Appeal--Jurisdiction, UT ST § 788-9-110

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 9. Postconviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-110
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-110
§

78B-9-110. Appeal--Jurisdiction
Currentness

Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court
havingjurisdiction pursuant to Section 78A-3-102 or 78A-4-103.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1174, efT. Feb. 7. 2008.

Notes of Decisions (3)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-110, UT ST§ 78B-9-110
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document
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RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, UT R RCP Rule 65C

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C

RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Currentness
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction

Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9. The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may challenge
the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal
under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired.

(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph (h), if the court comments on the merits of a

post-conviction claim, it shall first clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently precluded under
Section 78B-9- l 06.

(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court

in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court
may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.

~

(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the
conviction or sentence. The petition shall state:

(d)( I) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;

~

(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which
the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;

(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief;

(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been reviewed
on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of
the appeal;

(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil
proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results
of the prior proceeding; and
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RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, UT R RCP Rule 65C

(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence could
not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction
petition.

(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition:

(e)(I) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;

(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;

(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated
the legality of the conviction or sentence; and

(e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.

(t) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the

petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.

(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the
petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.

(h)(l) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that
any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the
claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate
with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.

(h)(2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and attachments,
it appears that:

(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;

(h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or

(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition.
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RULE SSC. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, UT R RCP Rule 65C

(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the
requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 21 days. The court may
grant one additional 21-day period to amend for good cause shown.

(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the petitioner
is sentenced to death.

(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be
summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to
serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge
to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.

~

~

(j) Appointment of pro bono counsel. If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the
request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the post conviction
court or on post-conviction appeal. In determining whether to appoint counsel the court shall consider whether the
petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing and whether the petition
involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.

(k) Answer or other response. Within 30 days after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such
other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the
petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with
Rule S(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be
permitted unless ordered by the court.

(I) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of

the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably
the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may:

~

(I)( 1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;

(1)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and

(1)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing.

(m) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the petitioner is
not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing.
The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court
during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the petitioner is confined.
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RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, UT R RCP Rule 65C

(n) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a party and
a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is
likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain
any relevant transcript or court records.

(o) Orders; stay.

(o )( 1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and
an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 7 days.
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will
pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed
by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(o )(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and the
court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.

(o )(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary
and proper.

(p) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems
appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78A,
Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to
charge for fees and costs.

(q) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.

Credits
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996; amended effective November 1, 2008; January 4, 2010; April 1, 2012; May 1, 2014.]

Editors' Notes
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence,
regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a sentence
other than commitment. Claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement are governed by paragraph (b) of
the Rule 65B. This rule, as a general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two significant changes
from procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the clerk of court to assign post-conviction relief to
the judge who sentenced the petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss frivolous
claims before any answer or other response is required. This provision is patterned after the federal practice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory committee adopted the summary procedures set forth as a means of balancing the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, UT R RCP Rule 65C

requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand against the public's interest in the efficient adjudication of the
enormous volume of post-conviction relief cases.
The requirement in paragraph (1) for a determination that discovery is necessary to discover relevant evidence that is
likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used in determining motions for
discovery.
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence,
regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a sentence
other than commitment. Claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement are governed by paragraph (b) of
the Rule 65B. This rule, as a general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two significant changes
from procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the clerk of court to assign post-conviction relief to
the judge who sentenced the petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss frivolous
claims before any answer or other response is required. This provision is patterned after the federal practice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory committee adopted the summary procedures set forth as a means of balancing the
requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand against the public's interest in the efficient adjudication of the
enormous volume of post-conviction relief cases.
The requirement in paragraph (m) for a determination that discovery is necessary to discover relevant evidence that is
likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used in determining motions for
discovery.
The 2009 amendments embrace Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction relief. It
provides an independent and adequate procedural basis for dismissal without the necessity of a merits review. See
Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 884-85 (10th Cir. 2009). It is the committee's view that the added restrictions which
the Act places on post-conviction petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,664 (1996) (relying on McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,489 (1991)).
Section 78B-9-202 governs the payment of counsel in death penalty cases.

Notes of Decisions (152)
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 65C, UT R RCP Rule 65C
Current with amendments received through September 15, 2016.
End or Document

<\ 2017 Tlh)mson Rl:!uter!-. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Digitized byReuters.
the Howard
Hunter
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
WE'.STLAW 6 2017 Thomson
NoW.claim
toLaw
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

1•

r
ill

!ADDENDUM C
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS, UT R RCP Rule 15
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KeyClle Red Flag- Severe Negative Treatment
Enacted LegislationAmended by 2016 UTAH COURT ORDER 0030 (C.O. 0030),

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Currentness
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 21 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original
pleading or within 14 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders.

(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party
to meet such evidence.

(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading.

(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as
are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original
pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party
plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.

Credits
[Amended effective May 1, 2014.]
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In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,
Case No. 130907566
vs.
Judge Vernice S. Trease
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.
In this action, Petitioner Osman Mohammed Noor seeks relief under the Postconviction
Remedies Act (PCRA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101, et seq., from his conviction and
sentence for burglary, forcible sexual abuse, and lewdness.Currently before the Court is
Respondent the State of Utah's (the State) Motion for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the
materials submitted by the parties in their briefs and at oral argument, !agree with the State that
Mr. Noor's claims are time-barred, and therefore, I GRANT the State's motion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
Mr. Noor was charged with burglary, forcible sexual abuse, and lewdness on July 6,
2009. Because Mr. Noor has difficulty speaking and understanding English, he required the
assistance of interpreters throughout the proceedings, including in his meetings with counsel, at
the preliminary hearing, and at trial.His case was tried to a jury and on January 4, 2011, a jury
convicted him of all three charges.
On February 25, 2011, Mr. Noor was sentenced to serve two concurrent prison terms of
one to fifteen years. Following his conviction and sentence, Mr. Noor filed a timely appeal. The
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in a ruling dated July 12, 2012, see State v. Noor,
2012 UT App 187,283 P.3d 543, and the Utah Supreme Court denied his certiorari petition on
October 17, 2012, see State v. Noor, 288 P.3d 1045 (Utah 2012). Mr. Noor did not pursue an
additional appeal to the United States Supreme Court.

~

~

Mr. Noor initiated the instant action when he filed his original petition for postconviction
relief (the Original Petition) on November 5, 2013. The Original Petition stated three claims for
postconviction relief: (1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel's failure to
adequately set forth grounds supporting a motion for directed verdict, (2) the trial court used a
jury instruction that incorrectly stated the elements of the forcible sexual abuse statute, and (3)
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because on appeal, counsel failed to raise trial
counsel's ineffectiveness or the erroneous jury instruction.

1

Inasmuch as this matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment I view the allegations and the
inferences stemming from those allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Noor, who is the nonmoving party.
SeeRoss v. State, 2012 UT 93, 'tf 18,293 P.3d 345.
1
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Along with the Original Petition, Mr. Noor filed a motion seeking the appointment of
counsel. The Court granted the motion and eventually, current counsel was appointed to
represent Mr. Noor in these proceedings. After counsel was appointed, the Court held a status
conference on April 27, 2015. At the status conference, the Court asked Mr. Noor's counsel ifhe
intended to file an amended or supplemental petition. Counsel responded that the Original
Petition was inadequate and that he intended to file an amended petition "to try and put some
substance to it." In the absence of any objection from the State, the Court granted Mr. Noor leave
to amend the Original Petition. Mr. Noor filed his amended petition (the Amended Petition) with
this Court on August 27, 2015.
The Amended Petition omitted all of the claims for relief that had been set forth in the
Original Petition. In their place, Mr. Noor asserted four new claims for relief. These included
two claims alleging that Mr. Noor's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he
failed to secure an interpreter to adequately help Mr. Noor understand the proceedings at trial; an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on allegations that problems with the interpreter
and a lack of communication between Mr. Noor and counsel prevented Mr. Noor from assisting
in his own defense, and a claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to inform Mr. Noor of the immigration consequences stemming from a conviction for the
crimes he was charged with.
ANALYSIS

The State now seeks summary judgment in its favor on all of Mr. Noor's claims.
Summary judgment is only appropriate where "the record shows that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ross
v. State, 2012 UT 93,118,293 P.3d 345 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the
State asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on several grounds. I need only
address one of those grounds, however, because the undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr.
Noor's claims in the Amended Petition are time-barred under the PCRA.
Under the PCRA, a petitioner seeking postconviction relief must file their petition
"within one year after the cause of action has accrued."Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(1). A cause
of action accrues on the latest of several dates, only one of which has been raised here:"the last
day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the ... United States Supreme Court, if no
petition for writ of certiorari is filed." Id § 78B-9-107(2)(c). The Utah Supreme Court denied Mr.
Noor's certiorari petition on October 17, 2012, which gave Mr. Noor until January 15, 2013 to
file a certiorari petition with the United States Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 13 (stating that a
petition for certiorari must be filed "within 90 days after entry ofthe order denying discretionary
review''). Consequently, under the PCRA, Mr. Noor had to file his claims for relief in this Court
by January 15, 2014.
There is no question that the Original Petition was timely filed before the limitations
period expired. However, the claims raised in the Original Petition are no longer before the Court
because the Amended Petition-which superseded the Original Petition-omitted all of Mr.
Noor' s original claims for relief. Thus, the only claims that are currently before the Court are the
new claims for relief that have been asserted in the Amended Petition.

2
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Here, the State argues that all of the claims in the Amended Petition are time-barred
because Mr. Noor brought all of those claims on August 27, 2015-more than a year and a half
after the statute of limitations expired. In response, Mr. Noor does not dispute that the claims in
the Amended Petition were brought after the limitations period expired. Instead, Mr. Noor argues
that the claims should be deemed timely because the Court granted him leave to amend the
Original Petition and, in any event, the new claims in the Amended Petition relate back to the
claims in the Original Petition. I disagree with both of Mr. Noor's arguments. 2

,,;.:~

\/.1ill

Turning to the first argument, Mr. Noor argues that the Court should deem his claims in
the Amended Petition timely because the Court granted Mr. Noor leave to amend the Original
Petition at the status conference held on April 27, 2015. However, at that status conference, the
limitations period was not raised by the parties or addressed the Court. To the contrary, counsel
for Mr. Noor only stated that he was requesting leave to amend the Original Petition "to try and
put some substance to it," and that he needed some time to "ascertain whether there are any other
issues that need to be raised" in the amended pleading. At no point did counsel make any
mention of the limitations period and its impact on the new claims. Therefore, the statute of
limitations issue was not before the Court, nor did the Court address that issue when the Court
granted Mr. Noor leave to amend his petition.
Furthermore, even if the statute of limitations issue would have been raised, it is doubtful
that the Court had any authority to extend the limitations period at the time of the status
conference. Indeed, to extend the limitations period at that time would have required the Court to
ignore the fact that the limitationsperiod had expired more than one yearbefore the conference.
Mr. Noor points to no authority that would have allowed the Court to reinstate and extend the
limitations period at that point. In the absence of any authority to indicate otherwise, and in light
of the fact that the legislature has sharply restricted a district court's ability to consider an
untimely petition for postconviction relief, see Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46,191,234 P.3d
1115, it does not appear that the Court had any authority to extend the limitations period when it
granted Mr. Noor' s leave to amend the Original Petition. 3
Turning to the second argument, Mr. Noor asserts that the claims in the Amended
Petition relate back to the claims in the Original Petition, and therefore, are timely.I disagree.
Under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an amended pleading that would
otherwise run afoul of the statute of limitations may be considered timely where the amended
pleading "relates back"to the original pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c).4 To relate back, the
2

In his current briefs, Mr. Noor does not argue that a different limitations period applies under the PCRA, nor does
Mr. Noor argue that the limitations period was tolled for any other reason. Therefore, the Court only addresses the
arguments raised by Mr. Noor in his memorandum opposing the motion at bar.
3

As the State notes, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that Utah courts may reach the merits of an untimely
petition where application of the limitations period would result in an "egregious injustice." See Gardner v. State,
2010 UT 46, fJ 93,234 P.3d 1115. However, Mr. Noor has not raised that exception in this case, and therefore, the
Court does not address the applicability of that exception to Mr. Noor's petition.
4

Under the PCRA, petitions for postconviction relief are governed by Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-102(1). If Rule 65C does not address a procedural matter, the Utah Rules
3

/:.J\
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new claim must "ar[i]se out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original
pleading." Id In other words, both the original and new claims must be "tied to a commoncore of
operative facts." Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005).
Here, it is clear that even the most liberal reading of the allegations in the Original and
Amended Petitions cannot sustain a reasonable inference that the claims in the Amended Petition
arise from the same factual allegations as the claims in the Original Petition. Indeed, the Original
Petition contains no allegations that relate to the claims asserted in the Amended Petition.
As discussed above, the claims in the Amended Petition are based on alleged problems
with Mr. Noor's interpreter during the trial, meetings with trial counsel and other legal
proceedings, and on defense counsel's alleged failure to inform Mr. Noor of the immigration
consequences of a conviction. The Original Petition makes no mention of any of those
allegations. While the Original Petition does mention Mr. Noor's difficulty speaking and
understanding English, the Original Petition does not discuss any problems with the interpreters
at trial or in Mr. Noor's communication with counsel. Instead, the Original Petition only alludes
to Mr. Noor's difficulty with the English language in connection with the claim that Mr. Noor
could not have formed the intent necessary to have committed the underlying
crimes.Consequently, it cannot reasonably be inferred that the allegations and claims in the
Amended Petition are based on the same operative facts and claims as the Original Petition. In
light of that conclusion, I agree with the State that the claims in the Amended Petition do not
relate back to the claims in the Original Petition. Therefore, the claims in the Amended Petition
are time-barred.

Based on the foregoing, I agree with the State that the undisputed facts demonstrate that
Mr. Noor'sclaims in his petition are time-barred under the PCRA. Accordingly, I GRANT the
State's motion for summary judgment.5 Counsel for the State is designated to prepare an
appropriate order consistent with this Ruling.
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2016.

Vernice S rease
Third District Court Judge
of Civil Procedure Apply. See id Here, Rule 65C does not address the amendment of a petition to add new claims.
Consequently, any such amendments are governed by Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5

In some instances, an amended petition that does not relate back to the original petition should be considered a new
petition and be filed in a separate proceeding. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 2015 UT 38, 'tMf 21-22, 345 P.3d 73 7
(concluding that a petition filed as an amended petition should have been filed as a new petition in a separate
proceeding where the new claims did not relate back to the original petition and were based on new evidence). In the
case at bar, the Amended Petition may represent such a petition. However, that issue has not been briefed by the
parties, who have focused on the timeliness and merits of the claims in the Amended Petition. Therefore, in the
absence of anything to suggest that the Amended Petition should have been filed as a separate postconviction
proceeding, I assume that the Amended Petition is properly before the Court in the case at bar.
4
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - APRIL 27, 2015

2

JUDGE VERNICE TREASE

3

(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

PROCEEDINGS TELEPHONICALLY

6

THE COURT: How are you, Mr. Boyer?

7

MR. BOYER: Doing well.

8

COURT CLERK: Mr. Alba, are you there?

9

MR. ALBA: I am.

Thank you, Judge.

10

THE COURT: Okay.

11

MR. ALBA: Good morning, Judge.

12

THE COURT: Mr. Boyer, why don't you move up and

13

Good morning, Mr. Alba.

maybe stand here next to the clerk's -

14

MR. BOYER: Sure.

15

THE COURT:

16

Okay.

17

M. Noor vs. State of Utah.

18

their appearances on the record, and then we will talk about

19

what we need to do next on the case.

20

- stand, and we'll call the case.

We're on the record in case 130907566, Osman
I'm going to ask counsel to state

Mr. Alba, why don't you go first.

And for the

21

record, counsel for Mr. Noor - pro bono counsel for Mr. Noor

22

appointed by the court is on the phone, and counsel for the

23

State, the respondent, is here in court.

24

MR. ALBA: Thank you.

25

Go ahead, Mr. Alba.

Sam Alba, Your Honor, of

Snow, Christensen, and Martineau appearing on behalf of Mr.
1
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1

Noor, and I was called by the clerk to accept the pro bono

2

appointment.

And after conducting a conflicts check with him

3

and the firm,

I accepted that appointment.

4

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

5

Mr. Boyer?

6

MR. BOYER: Daniel Boyer for the state of Utah.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

I set today for a telephone

8

conference to sort of discuss the status of this case.

9

Noor is not present.

Mr.

I didn't feel that his presence was

10

needed for the things we were going to discuss today, which

11

are primarily scheduling.
Mr. Alba, Mr. Noor, as you know,

12

filed a prose

13

petition challenging his conviction in this case and in a

14

habeas fashion.

15

dates,

16

supplemental or amended petition as counsel for Mr. Noor and

17

then set any further scheduling matters that we need to.

I wanted to inquire if you wanted time to file a

MR. ALBA: Thank you, Your Honor.

18
19

And before we proceed with setting any

Let me just

address the matter.
I have received a docket that your clerk was kind

20
21

enough to send to us, and I have reviewed it.

22

couple of things in it.
Number one.

23

I've noticed a

Prior counsel was appointed from

24

Holland

25

actually moved to withdraw after being on for a couple of

&

Hart, and I don't know the reasons why, but they

2
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months last year, and they were allowed to withdraw.
I have reviewed the original petition filed by Mr.

2
3

Noor.

I don't think it is adequate.

I think we need an

4

opportunity to try and put some substance to it. In order to

5

do that,

I need a little bit of time.

6

I have an assistant in my office, Jan Howell, who

7

has been trying desperately to get a copy of the transcript

8

from the trials.

9

been able to get that, but we need that in order to ascertain

We have not received that.

We have not

10

whether there are any other issues that need to be raised on

11

Mr. - on the petitioner's behalf, and I was going back to one

12

of these [inaudible] that I have for the court today.
THE COURT: Okay.

13

So I'm looking at the court

14

docket, and I don't believe that, first,

15

filed an amended petition.

16

is the original prose petition filed by Mr. Noor.

17

- and I don't think Mr. Boyer has an objection to giving you

18

time to file an amended petition.

counsel for Mr. Noor

So I think the only thing we have
I'm happy

Secondly, in terms of the transcript for the trial,

19
20

I don't know if one was filed in the original case.

21

take a look on the docket.

22

obtain one from the Legal Defenders office, if they, in fact,

23

filed the appeal for Mr. Noor.

I guess, the other option is to

MR. ALBA: Your Honor, let me just interrupt for a

24

25

I can

moment.
3
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In looking at the material that I have received, I

1
2

noticed as well that the State had filed a petition - or

3

pardon me - a motion - a memorandum in support of the State's

4

motion for summary judgment.

5

last year.

This was done way, way back
~

They make a reference to the transcript and to

6

7

portions of the transcript.

8

still have a copy of it or whether they obtained one or notTHE COURT: Okay.

9

10
11

MR. ALBA: - but I'm just relying on what I saw on
the docket itself.
THE COURT: Sure.

12
13

So I don't know whether they

Mr. Boyer, do you know - do you

have access to a transcript of the trial?
MR. BOYER: Your Honor, I do not know.

14

I will check

15

my file and see if I have a transcript.

16

be happy to forward that to either the court or opposing

17

counsel.

18

THE COURT: Okay.

In which case, I'd

So the docket on the underlying

19

case - the underlying case is number 091905211.

20

that there was an appeal to the Court of Appeals, a decision

21

affirming the conviction was issued by the Court of Appeals,

22

and then cert was denied when there was - a cert was taken to

23

the Utah Supreme Court, and that was denied.

24
25

It does show

Normally, the attorney general's Office (The connection with Mr. Alba was lost)
4
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1

THE COURT: Hello?

2

(Mr. Alba answered phone)

3

MR. ALBA: This is Sam Alba.

4

happened.

We got disconnected.
THE COURT: That's okay.

5

6

Okay, we need to call him back.

I don't know what

I apologize.
So there is a transcript

somewhere, and I'm sure we can get you a copy, Mr. Alba.
In fact,

7

now that I pull - I've been clicking on -

8

I've been clicking on some things filed in the underlying

9

case, and it does appear that there is a transcript of the

10

trial that was filed in the underlying case.

11

January 4 th ,

12

I

2011, it looks like.
just want to make sure that all the pages are

13

here.

14

have been a short trial.

15

The trial was

There's - it looks like there's a 170 pages.

It must

So what I can do - and it is a - it's a certified

16

transcript,

17

Alba, we can print - my clerk can print it off, and put it in

18

an envelope, and send it to you today?

19

it looks like.

Yep.

If you would like to, Mr.

MR. ALBA: I would appreciate that very much, Your

20

Honor.

If we could do that, then I would like,

21

that, I would like 45 days to be able to file an amended

22

petition on behalf of the petitioner.

23

THE COURT: Sure.

24

MR. ALBA: If I could?

25

THE COURT: Sure.

Okay.

in light of

So let's see should we 5
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1

if I give you until mid or end of June, is that sufficient

2

time, Mr. Alba?

~

MR. ALBA: That'll be sufficient, Your Honor.

3

4

you could possibly - let me think for a moment.

5

at my calendar.

6

If you could give me until the 26 th of June, I would

7

appreciate that very much.

8

THE COURT: Sure.

9

If

I'm looking

I'm going to be out the week of the 15 th •

filed by June 26 th ,

2015.

Okay.

So amended petition to be

And then I'm assuming once the

10

amended petition is filed, Mr. Boyer, you wish to file maybe

11

an amended motion for summary judgment or some responsive

12

motion?

13

MR. BOYER: Correct, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT: How much time did you need?

15

MR. BOYER: We would ask for 45 days.

16

THE COURT: Forty-five days?

Okay.

17

us to about the middle of August.

18

responsive pleading by the State August 14 th •

19

So that takes

So deadline for filing a

And then Mr. Alba, how much time after that would

20

you want to get to file your - well, let's do this.

21

the responsive pleading is filed,

22

dismiss or motion for summary judgment, then the Rule 7 time

23

will kick in.

24

plaintiff or petitioner to file something and so forth.

25

So once

either your motion to

The Rule 7 time will kick in for the def - the

And then once a notice to submit is filed,

I will 6
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1

my clerk will contact you and set a hearing for oral argument

2

on any motion that was filed.

3

If no motion - if no motion - if the State just

4

simply files an answer and does not file a motion for summary

5

judgment or a motion to dismiss, then we will - my clerk will

6

also contact you and schedule the matter for an evidentiary

7

hearing or whatever we need to do after that.

8

sound good?

9

MR. ALBA: That'll - that'll be fine, Judge.

10

THE COURT: Okay.

11

MR. BOYER: Works for me.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

Amy, did you get the dates?

14

COURT CLERK: I did.

15
16

Does that

It works for Mr. Boyer as well.

June 26 th and August 14 th on

[inaudible].
THE COURT: Okay.

And then Amy will send a print

17

off and send - you don't need - do you want a copy, or do you

18

think you have one, Mr. Boyer?

19

MR. BOYER: We probably do electronically.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

MR. BOYER: That'll be something that -

22

THE COURT: Okay.

If - anything else either of you

23

want, contact my clerk, and we can print it off, but she will

24

print off today for Mr. Alba the trial transcript that - it

25

was scanned for the trial on January 4 th ,

2011 in the
7
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1

underlying case of 091905211, and I think that will be it.

2

MR. ALBA: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Oh, -

4

MR. ALBA: I appreciate it.

5

THE COURT: Mr. Alba, my clerk just tells me also

6

that if it's preferable to you, she can email you the

7

transcript rather than send you a hard copy.

8

preference?
MR. ALBA: The electronic version would work just

9

10

Do you have a

fine.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

So after we get off the record

12

here,

13

email and send that to you today.

I - if you'll stay on, Mr. Alba, and Amy will get your

14

MR. ALBA: That'll be fine.

15

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

16

MR. BOYER: Thank you.

17

MR. ALBA: Thank you, Your Honor.

18

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

We'll be in recess.

19
20
21
22
23

24
25

(Transcript completed on October 7, 2016)
8
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DAVID VINCENT GREGG,
Case No. 20090567-SC
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
Appellant is incarcerated
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appel lee

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Appellant, DAVID VINCENT GREGG, appeals the district court's denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.§ 78A-3-102.

ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Several errors occurred during the trial and beyond in this case that are
encompassed within the following questions for review:

1.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Gregg's First
Amended Petition wherein be demonstrated several errors that tainted
the fundamental fairness of his trial, including false evidence and
ineffective assistance of counsel?
Standard of Review and Preservation: This issue was preserved in Mr.
Gregg's Amended Petition (RP37) and in his Second Amended Petition
(RP 128). An appeal from an order denying a petition for post-conviction
relief is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower court's
legal conclusions .. Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12.
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2.

May the procedural bars of the Post-conviction Remedies Act override
Mr. Gregg's right to due process of law and his right to counsel?

Standard of Review and Preservation: An appeal from an order denying a
petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness with no
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Nicholls v. State, 2009
UT 12. The multiple errors that deprived Mr. Gregg of due process
including his right to a fair trial and his right to counsel were raised and
preserved in his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (RP37), his
Second Amended Petition for Post-conviction Relief (R 128), and in his
Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Amended Petition for Postconviction Relief (RP 189). His claims relative to the Post-conviction
Remedies Act (PCRA) were raised and preserved in his Opposition to
State's Motion for Summary Judgment (RP367), his Response to State's
Reply Memorandum (RP488), Petitioner's Motion for Relief From
Judgment or Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (RP549), and Petitioner's Reply
Memorandum to State's Opposition to Motion for Relief from Judgment or
Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (RP574).

3.

Does the Utah Constitution allow the legislature to eliminate judicial
discretion to consider the merits of post-conviction claims involving
substantive rights?

Standard of Review and Preservation: An appeal from an order denying a
petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness with no
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Nicholls v. State, 2009
UT 12.
Constitutional questions, including whether a statute is
constitutional, are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. State
v. Alinas, 171 P.3d 1046, 1048 (Utah 2007). Statutes are presumed
constitutional with any reasonable doubts resolved in favor of
constitutionality. Id. This issue was preserved in the pleadings in Issue 2.
4. Did the district court err in concluding Mr. Gregg's claim that the
reckless mens rea shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and requires
him to prove consent in violation of the defendant's right to due process of
law, was not correctly framed as a challenge to the controlling statute's
constitutionality as applied in the context of rape?

Standard of Review and Preservation: An appeal from an order denying a
petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness with no
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Nicholls v. State, 2009
2
Digitized
by the
Howard
W.W.Hunter
Reuben
Clark
School,
Digitized
by the
Howard
HunterLaw
Law Library,
Library, J.J.Reuben
Clark
LawLaw
School,
BYU.BYU.
OCR, may
errors.
Machine-generated OCR,
Machine-generated
maycontain
contain
errors.

UT 12. Constitutional questions are questions of law that are reviewed for
correctness. Id. This issue was preserved in the pleadings noted in Issue 2.

5. Where appellate counsel's failure to marshal the evidence on direct appeal
is a matter of record, and where appellate counsel failed to raise trial
counsels' errors and prosecutorial misconduct, did the district court err in
concluding appellate counsel did not render deficient performance that
prejudiced Mr. Gregg on his direct appeal?
Standard of Review and Preservation: An appeal from an order denying a
petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed for correctness with no
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Nicholls v. State, 2009
UT 12. Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel present mixed
questions of fact and law. Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, 116. This issue was
preserved in the pleadings referenced in Issue 2.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Gregg was convicted by jury on one count of Rape on July 18, 2003, Case No.
031700275, and was sentenced to serve five years to life in prison. RT36 l, 365. 1
On direct appeal, Mr. Gregg's counsel argued the district court erred in denying
his motion to arrest judgment, which was treated by the appellate court as a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Gregg, 2005 UT App 258 (Unpublished
Opinion), Addendum A. The court declined to consider the issue because Mr. Gregg's
appellate counsel failed to marshal the evidence and simply reargued the weight of the
evidence supporting his trial defense, which the court noted was "a futile tactic on
appeal." Id. The court stated, "[E]ven if we disregard Defendant's failure to marshal the
evidence, our review of the record in the light most favorable to the verdict reveals that
there was sufficient evidence presented at trial [] to support the jury's verdict." Id.
1

The record for the underlying criminal matter is referenced as "RT." The record for the
post-conviction matter is referenced as "RP."
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This Court denied Mr. Gregg's petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Gregg, 125
P.3d I 02 (Case No. 20050663-SC).

Mr. Gregg filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief on October 2, 2006. RPI.
He filed an Amended Petition on February 20, 2007. RP37. Mr. Gregg's then postconviction counsel had represented him at trial yet raised claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel in the petition. Mr. Gregg retained current counsel in April 2007. RP 117.

(,,;.,.,

~

The district court denied Mr. Gregg's Amended Petition in its Ruling on
Respondent's [sic] Petition for Post-conviction Relief dated June 28, 2007.

RP122

(Addendum B). However, the court issued an order allowing current counsel to file a
Second Amended Petition for Post-conviction Relief on August 23, 2007. RP124, 128.
This Second Amended Petition raised new claims and also incorporated the claims raised
in the prior Amended Petition for the purpose of preserving them. RP128.
Finding the claims raised in Mr. Gregg's Seconded Amended Petition were
meritorious, the district court issued an Order Requiring Respondent's Pleading. RP235.
In April 2008 the State filed a motion for summary judgment and dismissal, arguing Mr.
Gregg's claims were procedurally barred under the Post-conviction Remedies Act
(PCRA) and his counsel on direct appeal did not render ineffective assistance. RP249.
The parties filed a number of other related pleadings and the court granted the
State's motion for summary judgment in its Ruling dated December 17, 2008. RPS 16
(Addendum C). The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order Dismissing Petition for Post-conviction Relief on January 29, 2009.
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RP535

(Addendum D). Mr. Gregg filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order Pursuant to
Rule 60(b) on February 26, 2009, primarily to request the district court to address claims
it appeared to have overlooked in its initial ruling denying his petition, and thus preserve
all of his claims for this appeal. RP549. He also timely filed a notice of appeal from the
district court's dismissal of his petition on February 27, 2009. RP554.
The district court also denied Mr. Gregg's 60(b) motion and he timely filed a
notice of appeal on that issue. This Court granted Mr. Gregg's motion to consolidate both
matters for this appeal. Because the purpose of preservation was accomplished by the
filing of Mr. Gregg's motion as well as the State's responsive pleadings and the district
court's ruling on the same, any challenges to the district court's ruling on that motion are
fairly encompassed within Mr. Gregg's first action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. Gregg arrived at the home of Suzanne Stacey at 2:20 a.m. on February 15,
2003, about 20 minutes after they had arranged to meet. RT417:29-30. They had not met
in person before but had communicated via three or four instant-messages on LDS
Singles Online (LDSSO), an internet dating service. RT4 l 7:29, 30, 34.
2. At trial Ms. Stacey portrayed herself as a devout Mormon. She testified she
used LDSSO because she "wanted to meet someone with the same interests and values
[she] had [and] ... find somebody maybe that would ... have those same interests and
values to help [her] raise [her four] children and instill those values in [her] children as
well.'' RT417:24. She "thought (] everybody [using LDSSO] had the same values and
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strategy to not subpoena a crucial witness.

All of this evidence was crucial to Mr.

Gregg's defense. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present it and appellate
counsel was ineffective for not addressing these errors on Mr. Gregg's direct appeal.

CONCLUSION
The procedural bars imposed by the PCRA have made this appeal more
complicated than it needs to be. The real issue is simple: Mr. Gregg was wrongfully
convicted when he was deprived of his right to a fair trial and to effective assistance of
counsel.

Mr. Gregg respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated.

In the

alternative, he requests that this matter be remanded for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted this /o1fiay of May, 2010.
JENNIFER K. GOWANS, P.C.

~l~

JenniK.Go~s

Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following:
Brett J. Delporto
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee
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PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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F iled: Motion and Order of Dismissal w ithout Preiud ice

Account Summary
Account

Details

REVENUE DETA IL -TYPE: COMPL ATNT - NO
AMTS

A moun t Due:

$

155.00

Amount Paid:

$

155.00

Amount C redit:

$

0.00

REVENUE DETAIL-TYPE: COPY FEE

REVENUE DETAl L -TYPE: COPY FEE

REVENUE DET A fL - TYPE: COPY FEE

REVENUE DETAIL-TYPE: TELEPHONE
CHAR GES

•

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE:
TELEPHONE/ FAX/EMA fL

REVENUE DETAlL - TYPE: TELEPHONE
CHARGES

•

060700501

Amount Due:

$

0.25

Amount Paid:

$

0.25

A mount Cred it:

$

0.00

Amount Due:

$

17.25

Amount Paid:

$

17.25

Amount Credit:

$

0.00

Amount Due:

$

6.00

Amount Paid:

$

6.00

Amount Credit:

$

0.00

Amount Due:

$

17.50

Amount Paid:

$

17.50

Amount C redit:

$

0.00

Amount Due:

$

17.50

Amount Paid:

$

17.50

Amount Credit:

$

0.00

Amount Due:

$

5.00

Amount Paid:

$

5.00

Amount Credit:

$

0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

Ba lance:

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE:
TELEPHONE/FAX/EMAIL

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE

Amount Paid:

$
$

5.00
5.00

Amount Credit:

$

0.00

Amount Due:

$
$
$

Amount Due:

Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:

060700501

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

Balance:

* $ 0.00

2.00
2.00
0.00

$

4.50

$
$

4.50

$
$
$

Balance:

0.00
205.00
205.00
0.00
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Errata
Mr. Noor notifies the court of a typographical error contained in his brief.
On page 16, footnote 2, the last sentence should read as follows, with the
alteration indicated in bold and underlined type: "Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court did not dismiss the case on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of
limitations, and rejected the procedural claims raised by the State."
DATED this 2'111 day of April, 2017.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ls/Robert T. Denny
Samuel Alba
Robert T. Denny
Attorneys for Appellant
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